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THE RULE OF LAW AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT:  
TREATY CONTEXTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Professor Locknie Hsu1 
School of Law, Singapore Management University 
[S]omeone claimed that these international investment agreement 
dispute settlements are an instrument for improved governance in 
developing countries, which I think is a very pretentious claim. … If 
we are going to meddle in countries, I would think this is the area of 
“transparency”, which would be very valuable … Whether [an 
investment agreement] promotes investment or not is questionable but 
at least it’ll promote due process. 
– Don Wallace, Georgetown Law Center2 
Contextualizing Investment Treaty Commitments and Rule of Law 
Notions 
There has been no agreement on what forms the precise content of the rule 
of law.3 As the late Lord Bingham aptly and candidly summed up the 
situation, when explaining why he had chosen the rule of law as the subject 
of the sixth Sir David Williams Lecture at Cambridge: 
                                                     
1 The author wishes to thank Mr Christopher Thomas QC for his helpful 
comments in reviewing this article. Any errors remain my own. 
2 Don Wallace, “Promoting and Protecting Investment in the Asia-Pacific 
Region: What is the Role for Investment Agreements” in Ian A Laird and 
Todd Weiler (eds), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law 
(JurisNet LLC, 2002) at p 75. 
3 See Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 2010), 
particularly chapter 10; Thom Ringer, “Development, Reform, and the Rule 
of Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the ‘Rule of Law’ 
and its Place in Development Theory and Practice” (2007) Yale Human 
Rights & Dev L J 178; as well as the pertinent remarks in the speech by Arthur 
Mitchell, General Counsel, Asian Development Bank, “The Role and Rule of 
Law in Asia”, reprinted in [2004] ADBLPRes 8, <http://www.asianlii.org/asia/ 
other/ADBLPRes/2004/8.html> (accessed 5 March 2014). 
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…the expression was constantly on people’s lips, I was not quite sure what it 
meant, and I was not sure that all those who used the expression knew what 
they meant either, or meant the same thing.4 
To add to this situation, the rule of law has taken on a globalised 
dimension. Put another way, the far-reaching effects of globalisation, 
normally thought of in the context of trade law and economics,5 have 
extended to the rule of law notion. Without attempting to define the rule of 
law, this article will use a number of hallmarks associated with it and link 
these to the globalisation phenomenon, particularly in relation to 
investment law. 
The intellectual discourse has produced considerable debate, leading to 
approaches such as the “thin” and “thick” approaches, and the formal and 
substantive approaches, to the rule of law notion.6 While it is not the aim 
of this chapter to fully address the presently intractable positions of those 
advocating either a “thin” or “thick” concept of the rule of law (leading to 
what appears to be an binary, “either-or” choice), a modest idea is suggested 
here as a small contribution to this debate. 
Three points matter here. First, policies that inform the law and legal 
systems of a state are often fluid and may, as a result, vary over time. 
Secondly, while there have been various attempts to capture the essential 
elements of “rule of law”, there is no universal consensus as to the criteria 
for measuring adherence to the “rule of law”, or as to its scope. Moreover, 
a national system that may be seen to be taking a “thin” rule of law 
approach may be said to be so by certain criteria (for example inclusion of 
certain types of penalties in its criminal law). Yet, the same system may be 
                                                     
4 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 2010) at p vii. 
The lecture took place on 16 November 2006 and is available at 
<http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/past_activities/the_rt_hon_lord_bingham_the
_rule_of_law.php> (accessed 5 March 2014). 
5 See, eg, “Economics and the Rule of Law – Order in the Jungle”, The 
Economist (London) (13 March 2008) <http://www.economist.com/node/ 
10849115> (accessed 10 June 2014). 
6 See Benjamin K Guthrie, “Beyond Investment Protection: An Examination of 
the Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law” 
(2012-13) 45 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 1151 at 1160-64, citing Brian Tamanaha, 
On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press 
2004) at p 91. 
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seen as having a “thick” rule of law approach in other respects (such as 
strong anti-corruption laws and enforcement). Finally, systems are generally 
not at one end or the other and usually fall somewhere in between. 
In light of these points, an alternative way could be to view systems as 
sitting on a continuum, between a purely “thin” approach (formal 
observance of laws and rules only, with no social justice considerations) and 
a purely “thick” approach (formal observance of laws and rules which carry 
a full panoply of social justice notions, not all of which are the subject of 
universal agreement). The advantage of such a view is that as systems are 
located along this continuum, they may adjust the “thin-ness” or 
“thick-ness” as their social and developmental values and needs evolve. As a 
society matures, this adjustment could move a state toward the “thick” end 
of the continuum. However, given the absence of agreement on the notions 
packing the “thick” rule end of the continuum, a state may arguably never 
reach that extreme end, depending on the criteria adopted. This frame of 
reference does not attempt to pass judgment over whether the location of a 
system on the continuum makes it “dysfunctional” or a failure, as an 
assessment of this would require examination of matters that encompass a 
broad range of factors (such as history, culture and characteristics of the 
political system) and not just those couched within the present rule of law 
concepts (over which there is, as mentioned, no agreement in the first 
place). While others have raised this notion of a continuum, it has not 
necessarily been discussed in a non-judgmental manner.7 
                                                     
7 See, eg, Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2002) at p 592; suggesting a continuum of the 
“dysfunctional” to “functional” to “some ideal”. In Randall Peerenboom, 
“Show me the Money: The Dominance of Wealth Determining Rights 
Performance in Asia” (2004) 15 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 75, note 14 at p 79, 
the author also suggests a “continuum” in the context of scoring the 
performance of states with respect to social, economic and other rights. See 
also John Gillespie, “Towards A Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into 
Developing Asia”, (2008) 40 Int’l Law & Pol 657 at p 657, and Suzanne 
Ogden, Inklings of Democracy in China (Harvard University Press, 2002) 
at pp 4–6; cited by Guo Dingping, “Institutional Accumulation and Gradual 
Substitution: The Dynamics of Developmental Democracy in China” (2009) 
China Papers No 7, New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, 
(continued on next page) 
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Where do foreign investment and related treaties such as bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs, which often 
carry investment treaty-type provisions and more) fit in with the above 
discussion, and how might they advance the promotion of movement along 
the continuum (toward the “thick” end)?8 In order to better appreciate this, 
one must understand the broader multilateral developments occurring from 
the mid-1990s, when the World Trade Organization was set up. First, let us 
consider the overall picture: globalisation has led to the breaking down of 
trade and investment barriers, through a web of international economic 
agreements. As a result, the rule of law is present in a number of contexts – 
in domestic legal systems, multilateral systems and bilateral/plurilateral 
systems. Multilateral systems refer to the agreements such as those that bind 
WTO members. Bilateral/plurilateral systems refer to those established by 
trade and investment agreements by a smaller number of participants, such 
as free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 
These systems co-exist and interact increasingly with each other. For 
example, multilateral rules such as those in WTO agreements affect the 
trade-related national laws of WTO members, how they are applied, and 
often even their national structures insofar as they affect cross-border trade. 
These rules also affect the bilateral or plurilateral agreements that members 
may enter into. Such agreements can and do, in turn, influence state actions 
and governance. 
Two key observations follow the above points. First, specifically relevant to 
the present theme, rule of law notions are evident in many of these 
agreements, even though the agreements may not always say so in 
express terms. 
Secondly, as these agreements often contain their own dispute settlement 
mechanisms (which may include state-to-state and investor-state 
mechanisms), they provide non-domestic avenues of scrutiny of acts of 
                                                                                                                      
University of Wellington, Victoria <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/chinaresearchcentre/ 
publications/papers/7-dingping-guo.pdf> (accessed 4 March 2014) at p 9. 
8 This is not to say that such treaties, when being negotiated, necessarily aim to 
promote the rule of law, or aim to encourage broad rule-making by 
investor-state tribunals. On the contrary, parties may be directly targeting 
encouragement of foreign direct investment and economic growth through 
signing such treaties; this can often be seen from preambular language of such 
treaties. 
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governance and accountability of states – which are related to the state of the 
rule of law in those states. 
Together, they lead one to conclude that the rule of law as it relates to 
governance that affects trade and investment matters has been acquiring a 
new dimension. This is not thought of as revolutionary, since BITs have 
existed at least since the 1950s. However, the proliferation of such 
agreements (and FTAs which usually contain investment protection 
provisions similar to those in BITs), together with their dispute systems 
which are available to private claimants to enforce the treaty obligations, has 
greatly magnified the potential to affect national laws and state actions of 
governance and regulation. In this regard there has been somewhat of a 
revolution. Some even use the term “globalised governance”. 
BITs and FTAs have therefore been instruments of a quiet legal revolution 
over the last two decades alongside the legal developments at the WTO. 
When the WTO was established in 1995, its members – comprising states 
only – committed to a large number of binding treaty obligations in a wide 
variety of areas, ranging from regulations on trade in goods to intellectual 
property rights. These have had broad implications and a significant impact 
on trade-related law reform, transparency and legal institutions in all WTO 
members.9 They have laid a foundation for, or in some cases, further 
strengthened, systems of protection for trade, and to a much lesser extent, 
investment (through the narrow provisions of the Trade-Related 
Investment Measures Agreement, or TRIMs) across member states. Several 
WTO treaty provisions contribute toward promoting the rule of law in 
member states, such as those governing transparency and publication of 
members’ laws and regulations (for example under GATT 1994) access to 
domestic tribunals (for example under TRIPs), decision-making processes 
by central and sub-central levels of government in relation to trade matters 
(and investment, to a more limited degree), requirements of express and 
clear exceptions (such as permitted reservations under GATS) and 
requirements that changes to the law be clearly notified and that 
appropriate public consultation should take place (for example under the 
                                                     
9 See, eg, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (15 April 1994) 
1867 UNTS 190 (“GATT 1994”), Art X and Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (15 April 1994) 1867 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 1 January 1995) (“WTO Agreement”), Art XVI. 
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Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, or SPS Agreement, 
and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, or TBT Agreement). To 
these provisions the WTO case law (which is ample) adds the notion that 
laws and regulations are scrutinized not only as they stand in the books but 
how a state applies and enforces them;10 this approach makes clear the need 
for substantive rather than merely formal compliance with the WTO rules. 
This body of law makes a contribution to the transparency and stability of 
legal rules for traders and investors and has also had a significant effect on 
rule-making in many legal systems within WTO states, provoking the 
implementation of laws and measures that promote the rule of law elements 
as found in many of these commitments. The fact that many states in the 
developing world and Asia have already legally subscribed to this system of 
adherence to both formal and substantive (rule of law-related and other) 
requirements in their WTO obligations (with the possibility of challenge at 
the WTO, if breached in either manner) is a matter that appears to have 
been underemphasised, if not overlooked, by commentators in this area. 
Given that WTO obligations span a wide variety of areas of law-making 
that affects trade, rule of law requirements embedded in such obligations 
have led to changes within national legal systems. The WTO dispute 
settlement system provides a means to scrutinize and promote compliance 
with these rules. In short, WTO members have made binding legal 
commitments, some of which affect domestic law-making and governance, 
which are now subject to WTO dispute settlement scrutiny. 
While this has been occurring at the multilateral level, states have also been 
entering into more BITs and FTAs than ever before. Asian states, in 
particular, have been increasingly involved in negotiating FTAs.11 Again, 
                                                     
10 Compliance with non-discrimination principles in the WTO is expected on a 
de facto and a de jure basis – see, eg, Federico Ortino, “WTO Jurisprudence on 
De Jure and De Facto Discrimination”, in Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann (eds), WTO Dispute Settlement System: 1995-2003 (Kluwer, 
2004). See also General Agreement on Trade in Services (15 April 1994) 
1869 UNTS 183 (“GATS”), Art XVII. 
11 See generally World Trade Organization (WTO), World Trade Report, 2011, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_e.htm> (accessed 
10 June 2014). The WTO system permits members to enter what are termed 
“regional trade agreements” (RTAs, often popularly known as FTAs) as long as 
certain criteria are fulfilled. 
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such agreements, with their various rule of law-related requirements, have 
had an impact on law reform and law-related institutions within the 
domestic systems of signatory states. One might venture to say that by 
entering such agreements, a state is at least signaling that it is open to an 
increased presence of the rule of law through observance of the relevant 
treaty provisions that promote it. As most FTAs and BITs carry dispute 
settlement provisions that allow investors to claim compensation or other 
remedies in the event of a breach of the treaty which causes damage to 
them, such treaty states are exposing themselves to challenge for 
government conduct or measures that may raise rule of law questions. 
Indeed, there have been a large number of investor challenges to investment 
host states on the basis of arbitrary, non-transparent or unfair treatment, as 
will be illustrated below. 
In addition, by entering into such treaties, consistent with the rules of 
customary international law pertaining to the operation of treaties, states 
also commit to international treaty law norms such as pacta sunt servanda,12 
which require them to adhere to their legal commitments – whether directly 
related to the application of rule of law principles or not. 
Apart from possible promotion of domestic rule of law, trade and 
investment treaties may also promote the international rule of law. 13 
According to Lord Bingham: “the rule of law in the international order is, 
to a considerable extent at least, the domestic rule of law writ large”.14 
                                                     
12 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 
1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), Preamble and Art 26. 
13 See, eg, Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, “Keynote Address: ASEAN 
Integration Through Law” (25 August 2013) <http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp- 
content/uploads/2013/09/Keynote-by-CJ-Menon.pdf> (accessed 20 January 
2015); and the Address by James Bacchus, former Chairman of the World 
Trade Organization Appellate Body, “Groping Towards Grotius: The WTO 
and the International Rule of Law” (1 October 2002) <http://www.worldtrade 
law.net/articles/bacchusgrotius.pdf> (accessed 5 March 2014). Tom Bingham, 
The Rule of Law, (Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 2010) at pp 110–11. 
14 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 2010) at p 111. 
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Trade and Investment Law: Domestic Reforms 
In both the trade and investment contexts, therefore, there is an increasing 
opportunity for external scrutiny – through treaty dispute settlement 
mechanisms – of government acts that may be alleged to be at variance with 
treaty obligations that express one or more aspects of rule of law norms 
(such as the obligation to refrain from arbitrary or discriminatory 
treatment) within a state. 
In the trade and investment law context, WTO commitments and 
bilateral/regional treaty activities have provided a certain impetus and 
incentive for increased observance of the rule of law.15 The core provisions 
of investment treaties which address investor concerns often give rise to 
such potential for rule of law impact, even if the treaty language does not 
expressly state so. What then are some examples of investment treaty 
provisions that embrace the rule of law and may play a role in promoting it 
in the signatory states? Examples include provisions assuring investors access 
to international arbitration (in which the arbitrators are to act 
independently and impartially), transparency of laws and regulations 
affecting foreign investments; sometimes, the right to be consulted on 
significant changes to laws and regulations; and the very common “fair and 
equitable treatment” (FET), national treatment and most-favoured nation 
treatment provisions. For the purpose of this article, it is the treaty 
dimension arising from BITs and FTAs that is addressed, as opposed to 
national laws on admitting foreign investment/investors. Such treaties can 
have a profound effect on governance and law-making in a state. 
                                                     
15 Of course, states may embark on legal change that promotes the rule of law 
due to other reasons, such as compliance with international aid and 
development programmes and internal political decisions. 
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The following discussion illustrates some of these investment treaty 
provisions, which cover a range of obligations.16 It is suggested that such 
provisions can have a salutary effect on the promotion of the rule of law in 
states, by forming enforceable obligations, the breach of which can be (and 
increasingly are) challenged in investment arbitration brought be 
disgruntled investors.17 The effect can be to nudge a state further along the 
rule of law “continuum”. Although the scope and boundaries of the rule of 
law are not a subject of universal consensus, as discussed above, a number of 
concepts have gradually been evolving and become associated with the rule 
of law, such as accessibility of the law, access to justice, non-arbitrariness, etc, 
many of which draw from international law and domestic administrative 
law principles. 
The jurisprudence that has sprung from arbitral tribunals interpreting FET 
and its scope has identified a number of factors that are relevant to these 
rule of law concepts. In fact in its recent efforts to negotiate clearer 
investment treaty terms, the European Union (EU) has recently attempted 
to distill a list of these very factors in order to spell out the ingredients of 
FET interpretation, as discussed below. These include ensuring due process, 
preventing denial of justice in proceedings, transparency and 
non-arbitrariness in decision-making. Recent rules supporting investment 
                                                     
16 See generally Benjamin K Guthrie, “Beyond Investment Protection: An 
Examination of the Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic 
Rule of Law” (2012–13) 45 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 1151 at 1160–64 and 
Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, “Investor-State Arbitration as 
Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging 
Global Administrative Law” NYU School of Law, Public Law Research paper 
No 09-46 (September 2009), <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1466980> (accessed 3 March 2014). Guthrie rightly notes that the rule of 
law concept (in the context of investment law) encompasses more than dispute 
resolution and the courts (at 1185). 
17 On the other hand, however, there are some potential difficulties when 
considering the rule of law in investment dispute settlement itself. For 
example, criticisms have been raised in two areas: first, about the independence 
of certain tribunals (for various types of reasons), and secondly, about the 
suitability of arbitrators adjudicating on national measures, particularly those 
relating to domestic health or environmental policy. Systemic fairness and 
legitimacy of the adjudicatory body – important aspects of the rule of law in a 
system – are at the heart of these criticisms. 
 
138   The Importance of the Rule of Law in Promoting Development 
treaty arbitrations can also help to reinforce rule of law notions when 
investment disputes are resolved, for example in the light of the Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration issued by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
in 2014.18 
Fair and Equitable Treatment 
A key investment treaty obligation is that found in the fair and equitable 
treatment (FET) provision. Undefined but developed in different and 
conflicting ways through investment tribunal awards, the meaning of FET 
has come to embrace a number of notions familiar to the rule of law 
debate.19 
FET, in arbitral “case law”, has come to focus on certain factors or 
benchmarks, discussed below. These factors have been developed in a 
number of separate investor-state arbitral awards and appear to have gained 
some degree of recognition. For example, the European Union’s policy on 
                                                     
18 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (effective 
date 1 April 2014) <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
2014Transparency.html> (accessed 10 June 2014). These Rules address 
transparency in arbitral proceedings; it should be noted generally that 
“transparency” in the investment law context may also relate to government 
decision-making and transparency in law-making and publication of laws and 
regulations (the latter being illustrated in Art X of GATT 1994). 
19 See also Benjamin K Guthrie, “Beyond Investment Protection: An 
Examination of the Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic 
Rule of Law” (2012–13) 45 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 1151 at 1160–64 and 
1186–88. For overview discussions of the FET standard as interpreted by 
tribunals, see, eg, Roland Kläger, “Fair and Equitable Treatment” in 
International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011); United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Fair and 
Equitable Treatment”, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II, UN Doc UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5 and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in International Investment Law,” (September 2004), 
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/337764
98.pdf> (accessed 5 March 2014). 
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its “new-age” investment treaties,20 now expressly provides as factors the 
protection given to investors in the following situations: 
(a) Denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; 
(b) Fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental 
breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative 
proceedings. 
(c) Manifest arbitrariness; 
(d) Targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such 
as gender, race or religious belief; 
(e) Abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and 
harassment.21 
Due to space constraints, the following is a selection of case illustrations 
relating to the FET obligation; it represents but a small fraction of the 
arbitral jurisprudence and is intended to provide a brief flavour of 
approaches to interpretation in these matters.22 
                                                     
20 The EU reformulated its investment treaty negotiation policy and practice 
after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty; see generally European 
Commission, Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment 
Policy, COM(2010)343 (7 July 2010) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf> (accessed 15 July 2014) and European 
Commission, Fact Sheet on Investment Protection and Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement in EU Agreements (November 2013) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151916.pdf > (accessed 7 March 2014) 
21 European Commission, Fact Sheet on Investment Protection and 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement in EU Agreements (November 2013). 
According to the Fact Sheet, its policy formulation will “avoid too wide 
interpretations and provide clear guidelines to tribunals”. The EU has been 
holding consultations on its investment dispute settlement provisions: see 
European Commission, “Commission to consult European public on 
provisions in EU-US trade deal on investment and investor-state dispute 
settlement”, European Commission Press Release (21 January 2014) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-56_en.htm> (accessed 10 June 
2014). 
22 For more detailed examinations of the FET obligation, see eg, Rudolf Dolzer 
and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2012) at Chapter VII: Standards of Protection. 
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Ensuring a stable legal system 
One of the factors considered in FET interpretation has been whether a 
host state has ensured a stable legal system within which foreign investors 
may operate. In CMS Gas v Argentina,23 for example, the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Tribunal stated as 
follows: 
[F]air and equitable treatment is inseparable from stability and predictability. 
(para 276) 
 
[A] stable legal and business environment is an essential element of fair and 
equitable treatment … [T]he measures that are complained of did in fact 
entirely transform and alter the legal and business environment under which 
the investment was decided and made. [The measures] resulted in the 
objective breach of the standard laid down in Article II(2)(a) of the Treaty. 
(para 281) 
In Impregilo v Argentina,24 the tribunal however said as follows: 
290. If fair and equitable treatment is indeed linked to the legitimate 
expectations of the investors, these have to be evaluated considering all 
circumstances. In the Tribunal’s understanding, fair and equitable treatment 
cannot be designed to ensure the immutability of the legal order, the 
economic world and the social universe and play the role assumed by 
stabilization clauses specifically granted to foreign investors with whom the 
state has signed investment agreements. The same approach was followed by 
the ICSID tribunal in Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania: 
 
It is each State’s undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign 
legislative power. A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law 
at its own discretion. Save for the existence of an agreement, in the 
form of a stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing 
objectionable about the amendment brought to the regulatory 
framework existing at the time an investor made its investment. 
 
291. The legitimate expectations of foreign investors cannot be that the 
State will never modify the legal framework, especially in times of crisis, but 
                                                     
23 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, 
award dated 12 May 2005. It should be noted generally that interpretations of 
FET may be influenced by other language of the treaty in question, such as its 
preamble. 
24 Impregilo SpA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/17, award dated 
21 June 2011 (original footnote omitted). 
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certainly investors must be protected from unreasonable modifications of that 
legal framework. 
 
292. In this context, the Arbitral Tribunal observes that the existence of 
legitimate expectations and the existence of contractual rights are two 
separate issues. This has been highlighted by the Parkerings-Compagniet 
tribunal, which made a clear distinction between contractual obligations 
under national law and legitimate expectations under international law: 
 
It is evident that not every hope amounts to an expectation under 
international law. The expectation a party to an agreement may have of 
the regular fulfilment of the obligation by the other party is not 
necessarily an expectation protected by international law. In other 
words, contracts involve intrinsic expectations from each party that do 
not amount to expectations as understood in international law. 
Protection of legitimate expectations of investors 
The legitimate or basic expectations of investors form part of the calculus in 
evaluating whether there has been a violation of an FET obligation. This 
factor was used by tribunals such as those in the Saluka and TecMed cases.25 
In a recent award, the tribunal in Teco Guatemala Holdings LLC v The 
Republic of Guatemala26 explained the “expectation” factor succinctly as 
follows: 
It is clear, in the eyes of the Arbitral Tribunal, that any investor has the 
expectation that the relevant applicable legal framework will not be 
disregarded or applied in an arbitrary manner. However, that kind of 
expectation is irrelevant to the assessment of whether a State should be held 
liable for the arbitrary conduct of one of its organs. What matters is whether 
the State’s conduct has objectively been arbitrary, not what the investor 
expected years before the facts. A willful disregard of the law or an arbitrary 
application of the same by the regulator constitutes a breach of the minimum 
standard, with no need to resort to the doctrine of legitimate expectations. 
                                                     
25 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic [2006] IIC 210 (UNCITRAL award); 
TecMed v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, award dated 29 May 
2003. 
26 Teco Guatemala Holdings LLC v Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case 
No ARB/10/17, award dated 19 December 2013, at para 621 (original 
footnote omitted). See also Micula v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, 
award dated 11 December 2013, at para 669, 671 and 673. 
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Non-arbitrariness and transparency of state action 
In TecMed v Mexico, 27  in applying the FET standard, the tribunal 
considered whether the host state’s actions were arbitrary or lacking in 
transparency. The following excerpt merits full reproduction here as it 
clearly features various components of the rule of law, with these 
highlighted in italics: 
154. The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, 
in light of the good faith principle established by international law, requires 
the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment 
that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the 
host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know 
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, 
as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or 
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such 
regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to such criteria should 
relate not only to the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the 
resolutions approved thereunder, but also to the goals underlying such 
regulations. The foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently, 
i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by 
the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as 
well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities. The 
investor also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the 
actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually 
assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive the investor of its investment 
without the required compensation. In fact, failure by the host State to comply 
with such pattern of conduct with respect to the foreign investor or its 
investments affects the investor’s ability to measure the treatment and 
protection awarded by the host State and to determine whether the actions of 
the host State conform to the fair and equitable treatment principle. 
Therefore, compliance by the host State with such pattern of conduct is closely 
related to the above-mentioned principle, to the actual chances of enforcing 
such principle, and to excluding the possibility that state action be 
characterized as arbitrary; i.e. as presenting insufficiencies that would be 
recognized “…by any reasonable and impartial man,” or, although not in 
violation of specific regulations, as being contrary to the law because: … (it) 
                                                     
27 TecMed v Mexico, [2003] ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, award dated 
29 May 2003. 
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shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety. [Original footnote 
omitted, italic emphases added] 
Arbitrary state action is therefore disciplined under the FET obligation.28 
Again, in LESI SpA and Astaldi SpA v Algeria,29 the FET obligation 
(“imported” via a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause), was explained as 
follows: 
[T]he State must act in a coherent, unambiguous, transparent manner, it must 
maintain an environment sufficiently stable to allow a reasonably diligent 
investor to adopt a strategy and implement it over time, and it must act in a 
non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner, without abuse of power and in 
compliance with its commitments. [emphasis added] 
Clarity of laws and application 
A lack of clarity of national laws may also form the subject matter of a claim 
of violation of FET. In Occidental Petroleum Corp v Ecuador, for example, it 
was noted the investor received “a wholly unsatisfactory and thoroughly 
vague answer” and that the tax law was changed without providing any 
clarity about its meaning and extent and the practice and regulations were 
also inconsistent with such changes.30 
                                                     
28 For a further, interesting discussion on arbitrariness, Jeremy Bentham’s 
formulation of the notion, judicial decision-making and law-making, see 
Timothy Endicott, “Arbitrariness” (2014) Can J L & Juris, <http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2378858##> (accessed 29 May 2014). See 
also Jacob Stone, “Arbitrariness, the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 
and the International Law of Investment” (2012) 25 Leid J Int’l L 77. 
29 LESI SpA and Astaldi SpA v Algeria [2008] ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, award 
dated 12 November 2008 (unofficial translation from www.IAReporter.com). 
30 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v the Republic of Ecuador ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, award dated 
5 October 2012, at para 184. 
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Denial of justice and due process 
In the tribunal decision in Mondev v United States,31 four situations relating 
to denial of justice were identified. These were: refusal of courts to entertain 
a suit, undue delay, administration of justice in an inadequate way, and 
clear and malicious misapplication of the law. The tribunal quoted the 
following from a prior award (which interpreted provisions of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)) in Azinian et al v. United 
Mexican States:32 
A denial of justice could be pleaded if the relevant courts refuse to entertain a 
suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer justice in a 
seriously inadequate way… There is a fourth type of denial of justice, namely 
the clear and malicious misapplication of the law. This type of wrong 
doubtless overlaps with the notion of “pretence of form” to mask a violation 
of international law. 
In Loewen v USA,33 the tribunal referred to the lack of due process as being 
relevant: 
Manifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome 
which offends a sense of judicial propriety is enough … . 
Access to justice for investors 
Treaties may, in addition to FET provisions, also contain certain additional 
guarantees regarding access to domestic courts or mechanisms of dispute 
resolution for the foreign investor. These can lead to scrutiny of the 
domestic mechanisms if challenges are raised as to their availability or 
effectiveness. As a result, in some investment disputes, even national judicial 
                                                     
31 Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID 
Case No ARB(AF)/99/2, award dated 11 October 2002, at para 126. 
32 Azinian et al v United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/97/2, award 
dated 1 November 1999. 
33 The Loewen Group, Inc and Raymond L Loewen v United States of America, 
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3, award dated 26 June 2003, at para 132. For a 
more recent view on denial of justice in the FET context, see Franck Charles 
Arif v Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No ARB/11/2, award dated 8 April 
2013, at para 427–445. 
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systems have come under scrutiny in whether a host state has provided 
proper access to justice.34 
In Chevron Corp (USA) & Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v Ecuador,35 
the following provision (known as an “effective means” clause, for short) in 
the relevant treaty came under examination by the tribunal: 
Art. II(7): Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and 
enforcing rights with respect to investment, investment agreements, and 
investment authorizations. 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that such a clause was 
lex specialis, distinct from the denial of justice obligation and that it poses a 
lower threshold than denial of justice. It can be violated by undue delay and 
unwillingness of the domestic courts for a case to proceed.36 It further 
decided as follows: 
While Article II(7) clearly requires that a proper system of laws and 
institutions be put in place, the system’s effects on individual cases may also 
be reviewed. The Tribunal thus finds that it may directly examine individual 
cases under Article II(7), while keeping in mind that the threshold of 
“effectiveness” stipulated by the provision requires that a measure of 
deference be afforded to the domestic justice system … 
 
The Tribunal finds that court congestion must be temporary and must be 
promptly and effectively addressed by the host state if it is to act as a defense 
to an otherwise valid claim for breach of Article II(7). That is to say, the State 
must have previously been in compliance with and must return to 
                                                     
34 See, for example, The Loewen Group, Inc and Raymond L Loewen v United 
States of America, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3, award dated 26 June 2003 
and White Industries Australia Ltd v the Republic of India (UNCITRAL), award 
dated 30 November 2011, where the clause in question was an “effective 
means” clause. For a general discussion of such clauses, see Benjamin 
K Guthrie, “Beyond Investment Protection: An Examination of the Potential 
Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law” (2012–13) 45 
NYU J Int’l L & Pol 1151 at 1189–92. 
35 PCA Case No 2009-23. 
36 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v Republic of Ecuador 
PCA Case No 2009-23, partial award on the merits dated 30 March 2010, 
at para 250. 
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compliance with the international standard within a short amount of time 
from when the backlogs arise.37 
In White Industries Australia Ltd v Republic of India,38 the long delays in 
proceedings brought by a foreign investor in the Indian judicial system 
came under scrutiny in an arbitration complaint by the investor. Among the 
provisions relied upon by the investor were an FET clause and an “effective 
means” clause. While the tribunal was sympathetic to India’s status as a 
developing country when considering whether the long judicial system 
delays were a violation of the FET clause, it found that these delays were 
however a violation of the “effective means” clause. 
ASEAN Economic Integration and the Rule of Law 
The rule of law in the context of enhanced integration efforts in ASEAN 
has been of increasing interest in recent years.39 However, there has been 
relatively little analysis of the rule of law in the context of ASEAN’s 
investment treaty provisions. 
The ASEAN Community comprises three “pillars”, including the economic 
“pillar” in the form of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), with the 
                                                     
37 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v Republic of Ecuador 
PCA Case No 2009-23, partial award on the merits dated 30 March 2010, 
at para 243–247. 
38 White Industries Australia Ltd v the Republic of India (UNCITRAL), award 
dated 30 November 2011, see especially 91–118. 
39 See, eg, Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, “Keynote Address: ASEAN 
Integration Through Law” (25 August 2013) <http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp- 
content/uploads/2013/09/Keynote-by-CJ-Menon.pdf> (accessed 20 January 
2015). See also Joel Ng, “Rule of Law as a Framework with the ASEAN 
Community”, (2012) Journal of East Asia and International Law 2, 327; Paul 
Davidson, “The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic 
Integration” (2004) 8 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 165; and 
Kitsuron Sangsuvan, “The Rule of Law in ASEAN” (2011) 40 International 
Law News. Other academic activity has increased in this regard too: see, eg, the 
Singapore Management University’s Asian Business and Rule of Law Initiative, 
<http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_aprl/> (accessed 5 March 2014) and the 
National University of Singapore’s ASEAN Integration through Law Project, 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/research-projects/cil-research-projects/asean/> (accessed 
5 March 2014). 
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emphasis of this article being on this “pillar”.40 In the ASEAN context, the 
rule of law has been receiving increasing treaty prominence over the last two 
decades or so. ASEAN is mentioned in particular in view of the ambitious 
2015 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) target. The AEC spells greater 
economic linkage and integration among the ten members but in the 
present context, it has also spurred the clarification of the role of law in 
ASEAN. It is well known that ASEAN has conducted its business through 
consensus-building processes which has come to be known as the “ASEAN 
Way”, rather than legalistic formulations and procedures. In recent years, 
however, a distinctly more rules-based approach has come to the fore. 41 
Seeing that the ASEAN Way was no longer adequate for some areas, 
ASEAN members embarked on a more rules-based approach, in its 
integration commitments and in the resolution of trade disputes between 
members. A key development in 1996 was the establishment of a 
rules-based dispute settlement system. ASEAN members drew confidence 
from having entered into a larger “model” of such a system at the WTO 
(through its Dispute Settlement Understanding).42 A number of important 
ASEAN treaties have made express reference to commitments to the rule of 
law.43 The landmark ASEAN Charter, for example, which was signed in 
2007, sets out objectives and principles which explicitly refer to, inter alia, 
the rule of law, good governance, principles of democracy, fundamental 
                                                     
40 The other two are the ASEAN Political-Security and ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
pillars. 
41 See Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary-General, “The ASEAN Way 
and the Rule of Law”, address at University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 
(3 September 2001) <http://www.asean.org/resources/2012-02-10-08-47-56/ 
speeches-statements-of-the-former-secretaries-general-of-asean/item/the-asean-
way-and-the-rule-of-law> and Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ASEAN 
Secretariat, “The ASEAN Way towards Community Building” (4 July 2005), 
<http://www.seaca.net/_articleFiles/692/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20ASEAN
%20Way%20Towards%20Community%20Building.pdf> (both links 
accessed 5 March 2014). 
42 Note that as at 1996, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam were as not yet WTO 
members. 
43 See, eg, the preamble and Articles 2(h), (i), (j) and (n) of the ASEAN Charter 
(20 November 2007, entered into force 15 December 2008), the ASEAN 
Economic Blueprint, and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(26 February 2009, entered into force March 29, 2012). 
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freedoms, and the promotion of human rights and of social justice.44 
Express references to the rule of law have also been made in other recent 
ASEAN agreements, such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ACIA). 45  The legal, political and economic diversity in 
ASEAN makes it important to unify ASEAN with this underpinning 
notion of rule of law. 
The ACIA, in particular, which of immediate interest to this article, is not 
only a strong signal of commitment by ASEAN members to strengthen 
investment protection for foreign investors. It is also a signal of 
commitment by each member to observe its provisions – including FET46 – 
in subjecting itself to the potential of investor-state dispute settlement. The 
rule of law, as with economic integration and development in ASEAN, is a 
work in progress, just as it is in many countries outside of ASEAN, and 
legally speaking, this is both a challenging and an interesting time for the 
region. The ACIA came into force in March 2012, and supersedes two 
earlier ASEAN investment agreements.47 It contains a number of important 
legal commitments mirroring those discussed above, such as those on 
FET, 48  MFN, 49  national treatment (NT), 50  expropriation and 
compensation51 and transparency.52 The ACIA also contains a number of 
explicit exceptions and permitted derogations. 53  Its FET provision 
explicitly refers in an explanatory fashion to denial of justice in legal and 
administrative proceedings, and to due process. Notably, the objectives of 
the ACIA, as stated in Article 1, include the following:54 
                                                     
44 See ASEAN Charter, especially the preamble and Articles 1(7), 2(2)(h)–(j). 
45 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (26 February 2009, entered 
into force March 29, 2012). 
46 Cf the specific language of ACIA Art 11. 
47 The text of the ACIA and members’ Reservations Lists are available at 
<http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/category/ 
agreements-declarations-7> (accessed 10 June 2014). 
48 ACIA Art 11. 
49 ACIA Art 6. 
50 ACIA Art 5. 
51 ACIA Art 14. 
52 ACIA Arts 21 and 39. 
53 See, eg, ACIA Arts 9, 17 and 18. 
54 ACIA Art 1(c). 
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… improvement of transparency and predictability of investment rules, 
regulations and procedures conducive to increased investment among Member 
states … [emphasis added] 
ASEAN members have therefore embarked on a mission to enhance 
transparency of their investment laws and rules, as well as committing to 
upholding the rule of law both explicitly, and via the various investment 
treaty provisions in the ACIA. 
Conclusion 
The rapid evolution of international trade and investment treaties has 
contributed much to law-making and governance at the national and 
international levels. Such treaties have often encapsulated aspects of norms 
and rules associated with the rule of law notion. By creating binding legal 
commitments containing such norms and rules, such treaties have had the 
potential of promoting the rule of law and good governance within national 
systems affected by them. ASEAN, with its ambitious integration plan that 
is expected to bring about the AEC in 2015, has chosen to expressly 
embody such norms in some of its recent treaties and other documents. 
The globalisation phenomenon has affected not only purely economic 
spheres but has also been leaving its mark on the rule of law. As 
economically and politically diverse nations such as those in ASEAN – some 
of which are undergoing a sea change in their economic and investment 
policies – work to integrate further, the rule of law can be an important 
underpinning and unifying concept in international and regional economic 
agreements. As economic treaty-making efforts continue around the world 
in the midst of economic and non-economic tensions and vicissitudes, it is 
apt to conclude with the following rather inspiring and timeless language, 
drawn from the preamble of the Declaration of the High-level Meeting of 
the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International 
Levels: 
We agree that our collective response to the challenges and opportunities 
arising from the many complex political, social and economic 
transformations before us must be guided by the rule of law, as it is the 
 
150   The Importance of the Rule of Law in Promoting Development 
foundation of friendly and equitable relations between States and the basis on 
which just and fair societies are built.55 
 
                                                     
55 Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of 
Law at the National and International Levels, Un Doc A/RES/67/1 
(30 November 2012) <http://www.unrol.org/files/A-RES-67-1.pdf> (accessed 
29 May 2014). 
